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To challenge the way things are is always difficult. Yet many people in Palestine/Israel, the diasporas, live the courage to reclaim another future. They refuse to abide by actions committed in their name, in our name, in my name.
-Heidi Grunebaum
In the meantime, however, it is important to come to a better understanding of how it is exactly that many of us resist and survive in this world. Given that we are systematically constructed in ways that run contrary to our own self-identifications, given that we are fundamentally viewed as illusory-as either evil deceivers or as openly bogus-how do we find the moral integrity and real-ness which has been taken from us? When we claim "reality" what do we mean? In what sense, specifically, is authenticity claimed in resistant assertions such as "being true to oneself"? What does it mean to lay claim to a gender category such as "man" or "woman" in the first place in cases in which such categories are claimed in opposition to the natural attitude? How is it so much as possible to meaningfully make such resistant claims-to oneself and to others? - Talia Bettcher In 2013 I attended a Cape Town screening of The Village Under the Forest, a South African film made by Mark J. Kaplan and Heidi Grunebaum, based on Grunebaum's experiences and reflections around a forest planted in Israel with donations from South African Jews, including Grunebaum as a child.
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Unbeknownst to the donors, the forest was planted on the ruins of Lubya, a Palestinian village destroyed in 1948, whose displaced residents still return to visit the site of their former homes. The film traces Grunebaum's efforts to come to terms with what was done in her name. In a discussion held after the screening, two elderly Jewish men spoke about their differing feelings about claiming a Jewish identity. Both had been anti-apartheid activists and had faced ostracism from the organized Jewish community in South Africa, which had for the most part avoided engagement in the struggle. One of them said that now, post-apartheid, he did not identify as Jewish, but simply as South African, as a citizen of the new "rainbow nation." The other said that, in line with the politics of the film, he felt morally bound to identify as a Jew, as someone in whose name policies of the state of Israel that he abhorred were being carried out.
That second response resonated deeply with me, both reflecting my own current convictions and reminding me of what I had learned as a child (a sentiment I recall as attributed, probably apocryphally, to Einstein): I am a Jew so long as there is antisemitism in the world. Just as it is dishonorable not to speak out when wrongs are done in my name, it would, I was taught, be dishonorable to dis-identify, given the chance, from those with whom I share a stigmatized identity, to walk away from my people. But who are "my people," either as threatened (as Jews still are) or as culpable? How am I interpellated as a Jew? How does that come to be my name?
I want to think these questions alongside analogous questions about things being done in my name as a (particular sort of) woman. Two examples: racist aggression against Black men has frequently been carried out in the name of protecting white women from the mythical Black rapist, and in North Carolina and elsewhere efforts are being made to bar transgender women from using women's restrooms in the name of protecting cis women from assault. As a white cis woman I want to say in both cases: not in my name; and my standing to do so requires my acknowledging that those are in fact my names, that I am among those allegedly being protected.
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Natal Facticity
One striking similarity in all these cases is that, while there is much that I can choose to do or refrain from doing, there is a level at which I experience the relevant identity (Jew, white woman, cis woman) as a brute, unchosen fact about me-in Sartrean terms, attaching to me as an être en-soi (being in-itself, like my being a mammal) rather than as an être pour-soi (being for-itself, like my being a philosopher or a feminist).
3 I cannot actually imagine not being a philosopher or a feminist-these are very deep and defining aspects of who I am-but I recognize that I am those things because of my own choices, that my being them requires my reaffirmation, and that I must take personal responsibility for those identities. I would like to suggest that it is part of the social logic of Jewishness and gender-part of how they are socially constructed-that for many (though surely not all) natal Jews and natal women those identities are experienced not only as unchosen (as gender identity is experienced as unchosen by very many trans women and men), but as unproblematically, unreflectively, and unchangeably given at birth.
We are not mistaken to think that these are in one sense brute facts about us-any more than those of us who were born in the United States are mistaken to think that our being citizens has nothing to do with anything we have chosen: the United States, unlike some other countries, confers natal citizenship on anyone born here. But, on another level, none of these is a brute fact in quite the same way that my being a mammal is: we are all collectively responsible for how these identities work. To deploy the Sartrean categories, the point is this: it is clearly a matter of bad faith for me to claim that I was "born that way" when it comes to being a philosopher or a feminist: these are identities I need to recognize as chosen and for which I need to accept responsibility, in a way that I do not have to do when it comes to being a mammal. It is more complicated when it comes to my being a woman or a Jew: I was born into both those identities and I subjectively experience them as given and unchangeable facts about me, but my experiencing them that way has to do with specific social practices to which I want to draw our critical attention.
The relevant practices are in each case complex, and they differ in significant ways. Natal citizenship can be renounced: back when I moved to Canada (in the 1970s), had I taken out Canadian citizenship, I would have automatically forfeited my US citizenship. That is no longer the case-dual citizenship is allowed-but it is possible voluntarily to renounce one's US citizenship, typically as a thoughtful, considered choice, often as a political statement. One can also cease being a woman, though almost certainly not as voluntaristically. Even those whose trans identities are not experienced as life-long and unambiguous usually describe the process as more discovery than choice, of coming to acknowledge and getting others to acknowledge who and what one is, so that, for example, whatever medical interventions one might choose to have are confirming rather than determining. And, as I will discuss below, Jewishness is generally taken to be completely irrevocable: given certain facts about one's genealogy, one can neither choose no longer to be Jewish nor come to the realization that one really is not. Thus, in my case, while I doubt I will ever renounce my US citizenship, I can imagine doing so, but I cannot imagine ceasing to be a woman, and more than the limits of my own imagination prevent me from ever ceasing to be a Jew. But what all these cases have in common is that what makes it the case that I am a US citizen, a woman, or a Jew is not a matter of how I feel, nor do I know any of these things about myself by anything like introspection.
Another Making such claims about my own identity as a woman or a Jew is seriously problematic, since they are very close to claims that serve to marginalize converts to Judaism and (especially in the current climate, far more perniciously) trans women. It is not enough to say-as I very much want to saythat I do not think that the ways in which I am a Jew or a woman (what I call the "natal facticity" of those identities as I experience them) is any more "real" or in any other way better than other ways. It is not enough in part because I want to go on to say that I think that natal facticity is an important feature of the ways in which Jewishness and gender have been socially constructed. That there are such people as women or Jews in the world at all is a matter of social practice: the argument made by feminists that biology alone does not create gender, that women and men are social categories is, I take it, even more obvious in the case of Jewishness. 4 What that means is that, unlike my being a mammal (which is not only out of my hands but out of our collective, social hands, a brute matter of fact, no matter how I might experience it or what we collectively do 5 ), the natal facticity of my being a Jew and a woman is a matter of social practice: it is because "we" do what we do that I can experience these identities as being out of my hands. If enough of us were to do things differently enough-if we were to stop ascribing gender or Jewishness to newborn babies and expect (or require) them to carry those identities indelibly throughout their lives-that experience would change. I would need to take personal responsibility not just for how I live as a woman or a Jew, or for what is done in my name, but for my having those identities at all.
In the case of gender, that is a change I take myself as a feminist to be committed to: while different ones of us have very different, and frequently incompatible, stakes in how we do gender, I take those differences to be very much in our collective hands and to be matters for ethical and political struggle rather than for detached conceptual analysis, as though such analysis could take place prior to and without substantively engaging anything ethical or political. Furthermore, the last thing we should expect, or want, at this point is to be able to articulate a unitary account of just what gender is. What we need, rather, is clarity about what the different stakes are, about who benefits from and who is harmed by our practices, and about how we might do better, recognizing that, for example, as Joy Ladin points out, 6 gender fluidity might work well for some trans people but very badly for others, for whom "real-ness" in the gender they know themselves to be is threatened by playful or subversive messing with the boundaries.
In all the cultures I know anything about, everyone is natally gendered. 7 Most people do not come to contest the truth of that determination, however much they might contest its implications or live it variously transgressively: they are, that is, not transsexual or otherwise transgendered. The term "cis-gendered" was coined in order to mark that condition as one particular way (albeit diversely lived and experienced) of relating to the sex/gender system; it is not meant to imply that one conforms to or accepts the validity of gender norms. But natal gendering is a social practice, and we might imagine not engaging in it or engaging in it very differently. Gendering might, for ex-ample, work more the way many, paradigmatic forms of Christian identity do. In this model babies born into Christian families are presumptively Christian and may well be baptized; they are typically exposed to Christian teachings and practices and are expected to take those on as their own, often receiving religious education that leads to what is fittingly called "confirmation" at an age at which they are presumed to have some understanding of and responsibility for their faith. As adults they are not fully, properly Christian unless they continue to profess the faith freely on their own; and-crucially-they are no more paradigmatically Christian than are adult converts. Those born into such Christian families are put on the path toward being Christian, and they are typically expected to follow that path, but they might not; and if they do not, they end up being not Christian but something else, such as Jewish or Hindu or atheist. Though there is a sense in which Christianity is the default identity for those living in European and European-settler societies, on this model what it is to be a real Christian is a matter of individual faith, making the convert not just intelligible but paradigmatic. If natal gendering were like that, the gender assignment that followed from genital inspection (on ultrasound or at birth) would be similarly tentative and aspirational, and children would be guided toward it more or less aggressively, just as Christian families and communities can be more or less aggressive about inculcating religious faith in children. And such guidance would go along with the knowledge that it might not take, and that if it does not, it does not, and the alternative path the child comes to follow is the one that determines gender identity.
Think, by contrast, about how natal Jewish identity works. It is not only nonconsensual, but also not at all tentative: its full "real-ness" does not await subsequent informed consent. It is also irrevocable: nothing, not even conversion to another religion, can make one not-Jewish. This fact, of the inalienability of Jewish identity, while most striking in the case of secular Jewishness, has resonances with much, though not all, of religious Judaism, which, unlike Christianity, is not creedal and in some cases is openly accepting of agnostics and even atheists. For many practicing Jews religious observance is less a matter of faith than it is a way of belonging to a community, of connecting with one's history, and of keeping traditions alive.
If the model of Christian identity holds one sort of liberatory possibility for thinking about and constructing gender identity, the model of inescapable natal Jewish identity holds another. One of the consequences of my not being able not to be a Jew is that-given the paradigmatic nature of my natal Jewishness-there is nothing I need to do to prove that I really am one. I may, in various people's eyes and for a wide range of often conflicting reasons, be thought to be a bad Jew, but it is beyond questioning, not undermined by anything I might do, that I am a real one. I do not want to downplay the social and psychological consequences some people experience from being judged to be a "bad" Jew, especially when such judgments amount to ostracism from an identity-grounding community. But even in such cases, those who are cast out-whose parents might even say Kaddish for them as though they were
Journal of Jewish Identities dead-are never simply, wholly not-Jewish. The indelibility of the mark remains even when one is excoriated for having besmirched it. 8 The flip side, that is, of my being unable not to be a Jew is the absence of any disciplining apparatus to which I need to conform in order to be a real one. And this model points to a different sort of liberatory possibility for how we do gender. If applied to gender, it would undermine gender roles and gender stereotyping, supporting the idea that one's gender does not set or limit one's possible ways of being in the world affectively, intellectually, relationally, professionally, sartorially, and so on. While this possibility is far from being realized, many of us in a range of ways enact some version of it in our own lives, and it is an irony that cis privilege can facilitate our doing so. Many, especially otherwise privileged, cis women can be quite cavalier about gender norms, facing possibly nasty backlash if we deviate from some of them, but unlikely to be literally misgendered. 9 I do not need to convince anyone that I really am a woman, a freedom that can allow me to thumb my nose at gender norms that a trans woman may feel she needs-or even deeply wants to be able and be allowed-to conform to.
These two possibilities-gender as grown into, not set at birth, and gender as non-prescriptive-are illuminated by emerging transfeminist theory and practice, notably as articulated by Talia Bettcher.
10 Drawing on María Lugones's theorizing of multiple, overlapping and interacting, worlds of sense, 11 Bettcher argues for resisting the demand for a single, inclusive definition of gender (or woman) in favor of recognizing the specific vulnerabilities and forms of violence differently inflicted and enabled by gendering practices, and the need for multiple, overlapping and interacting, conceptualizations of gender to account for and foster resistance to those harms. Thus, for example, the natal marking of femaleness as subordination that many feminists point to as fundamental to gender and to what it means to be a woman can and should be engaged in an interactive relationship with the diverse ways in which trans women experience themselves as women, including with how that identification is variously important to them but also exposes them to distinctive forms of violence and violation.
Natal Facticity and Social Construction
Jewishness is heritable because of what we, collectively, do. As I have argued in a series of essays, 12 understanding appeals to "what we do" is at the heart of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, and part of that understanding is dropping the "merely" that typically precedes its invocation, resisting the ontological devaluation that often attends claims that something or other is socially constructed, as though that made it less than fully real, as "merely what we do":
As the anthropologist Barbara Meyerhoff wrote about ritual, the power of realist discourse requires that we not catch ourselves making it up. Her point, of course, is that ritual is powerful, even though we have made it up; but it is risky: every time we engage in it, even as in so doing we reinforce its power, we expose it and ourselves to the "scandal" of our own agency. Wittgenstein's exhortation that we attend to what we do in using language is similarly risky, as is the frequently reiterated feminist exhortation that we "denaturalize" the ways in which we think sex, gender, and sexuality, in order to reveal in order to challenge, the ways in which those categories work.
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What we do can be as solidly real as something that is out of our hands, but that solidity can "melt into air" if enough of us cease to do "what we do," or even just draw attention to, let alone trouble, our own practices as we continue to enact them. It might not be in my hands to cease to be Jewish, but it is in our collective hands to set the terms on which anyone can claim or disclaim Jewishness, and drawing attention to this fact is already to destabilize it. One consequence of this thought is that my own identity as a secular Jew is dependent on practices I do not myself engage in, including religious and culturally specific practices (as well as raising Jewish children) that ensure that there continues to be such a thing as Jewish for anyone to be. That dependence captures one sense in which things are being done "in my name," giving me an interest in, some responsibility for, and some standing in relation to the practices in question.
A frequently noted problem with projects of definition and conceptual clarification around identity categories is that they are typically, especially as academic exercises, carried out by the more privileged members of the group in question, enshrining as essential, or at least paradigmatic, characteristics peculiar to those members-thus, for example, the challenges women of color have posed to white feminist theorists.
14 As Vicky Spelman argues, it is a mistake to conclude from this tendency that all attempts at general definition are doomed: there is reason to believe that starting from the perspectives of less privileged members of the group might produce more genuinely generalizable accounts. 15 Those accounts might not be immediately recognizable to the more privileged: the definitions might seem (might actually be) revisionary, shifting what counts as essential or paradigmatic. I want to take this admonition seriously even as I raise questions about accounts of gender identity that, starting from the perspectives of trans women (and men), focus on a first-person, inner sense of one's own gender identity. That is, I do not want it to be an obviously fatal flaw in such accounts that they fail to capture my own experience (or the experience of many cis women). Perhaps I (we) do have such a sense of gender identity but fail to notice it, because it is lined up with all the other markers of gender that we are not questioning. That might actually be the case, but I think there is another, better explanation.
As I suggest above, drawing on Bettcher, we run into this problem-of difficulties in finding an account that does justice to the widest range of different experiences of gender-because of our demand that there must be such an account, that if trans people's gender identity is taken to be as real as that of cis people, there must be something we all have in common, something that gender is, something that trans and cis people have equal claim to. But if gender is a social construction, a matter of "what we do," there is little reason to think that such a unitary definition is possible, given the wide-and contested-variety of practices we variously engage in and of worlds of sense we inhabit. And variability between worlds of sense is not just between different individuals or groups, but internal to the lives of many people, though to differing extents and under differing conditions of choice and coercion. Sarra Lev, in her essay in this volume, 16 discusses this phenomenon as it plays out in the lives of many people who identify-at least some of the time, in at least some contexts-as Jewish. And even as they vary and are contested, the practices that construct women or Jews have histories that they carry with them and, importantly, diverse histories and practices are complexly related to and dependent on each other. 17 In particular, I think we would lose something important about what gender is-as we would lose something important about what Jewishness is-if we were to stop taking natal facticity to be an important part of how many people end up in those categories, and how they experience their membership in them. For example, it is important to many trans people to claim that they have always been the gender with which they identify, that their gender identity is as fixed and immutable as that of the most gender-normative cis person. Given how gender has, in cultures like ours, been assigned and lived, especially in dominant discourses, such claims are understandable and must be credited, and there is nothing to pin them on but something inner, inaccessible to the rest of us (though some people hope-wrongly, I would argue-for vindication from some future scientific discovery, typically having to do with brains). 18 But such determinateness is being challenged by other trans people whose experiences are of flux, boundary-troubling, non-binary queerness, and other manifestations of something other than stable, life-long inner certainty. 19 The pressures on normative gendering-gender identity that is conferred at birth by inspection of external genitalia and that unfolds throughout one's life in accordance with that conferral-come, that is, both from those who claim a clear and stable, natally factual gender identity that does not accord with how they were labeled at birth, but even more from those who claim a gender identity that is, in various ways, not clear and stable. Much of the medico-juridical policing of transsexual women's and men's gender identity has functioned to minimize the disruption of heteronormative gender. But beyond that policing, and more controversially, I have argued that there would not be such a thing as a clear, stable gender identity for anyone to claim without the social practices that assign gender at birth with the expectation that that assignment will hold fast for the person's lifetime-just as there would not be such a thing as Jewishness for converts to claim were some people not Jewish by birth.
20 Judaism, as a religion, could, I assume, survive the loss of natal Jewishness, becoming in that regard more like Christianity; but such a change would change not only the experience of Jewishness of many natal Jews (secular as well as religious), but also the experience of many (though of course not all) Jewish converts, for whom conversion is more a matter of joining a "people," being an acknowledged member of a particular community, than it is of espousing a faith, harking back to Ruth's vow to Naomi: "thy people shall be my people."
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I agree with Ladin that there are, and have always been, a wide range of ways to be Jewish; 22 and nothing beyond what we (Jews) do will make it continue to be the case that one can be born a Jew and remain one no matter what one does or believes. But if that were to change-if Jewishness were absorbed into Judaism and Judaism were to become in that regard more like Christianity-I think something important would be lost-even as I cannot make coherent sense of what that "something important" is. Part of what it is, of course, is what I am, and my attachment to it is obviously self-interested. But that self-interest is not selfish: the self I am protecting is one for which I feel deeply responsible: it is a self in whose name many things are being done, many of which I am deeply at odds with, and my being able to say "not in my name" depends on its truly being my name.
I am less attached to my being a woman-or, at least, so I think: I am readier to embrace the idea of our practices of gendering withering away; and that readiness comes not despite, but oddly in part because of, my gender's being far more normatively legible-than my Jewishness. My being a woman does not strike me as fragile, as in need of protection-it might well be that I think I can happily imagine its going away because I cannot really imagine it at all, and I certainly do not need to struggle to secure it or to make sense of it. But among the things that are being done in my name as a cis woman are legal and social acts of marginalization and violence directed at trans women and men, for many of whom being able to claim a stable, recognized gender identity is both important and a matter of struggle. As with Jewish identity, there are many ways of being gendered, and not all of them are stable and clearly marked: it matters as well that the world be safe for gender outlaws, for those who are variously gender-queer. There is not-nor should we attempt to craft-a single conception of gender that will work for everyone; but that makes it more, not less, imperative that we engage in critical conversation about the ethics of how we each of us live our genders, recognizing the ethical responsibilities that inhere in how we name ourselves, how others name us, what is done in our names, and how we respond to what is done.
Activism and theorizing, grounded in the sharing of diverse lived experiences of trans women and men, have substantially challenged the heteronormative narrative, greatly increasing the range of intelligible life stories. One important, often overlooked or even actively denied, consequence of this change has been the effect on how gender is conceptualized and lived for cis-gendered as well as for trans women and men: the term "cis-gendered" for a start. Those of us whose gender conforms to our birth-assigned sex used to be simply, unremarkedly "normal." Some trans-friendly non-trans feminist women I know resent being referred to (and expected to refer to themselves) as cis women. We (non-trans folks) ought, they argue, to have the same right to self-identify that is being claimed by trans women and men. One response to that argument is that if how we choose to identify is simply as women (or men)-un-marked-that choice reinforces the presumption that our gender is not just to that extent normative (conforming to social norms) but normal; and surely feminist, anti-racist, and anti-heterosexist politics have alerted us to the problems around the privileging of unmarked identities. But a possible reply to that response is that identifying as simply a woman or a man ought to be as open to trans people as it is to non-trans. Rather than expecting all of us to mark the conditions of our gendering, we ought to leave it open to people-trans or non-trans-to mark those conditions only when and where it is important or appropriate for us to do so.
That reply seems right to me: in many (most?) circumstances in which we are called upon to claim a gender, none of us should be expected to mark just what sort of woman or man we take ourselves to be; it ought to be irrelevant, for example, when it comes to which public restroom we use or which pronouns others should use in referring to us. There are, however, circumstances in which it is important to note, or acknowledge, that I am cis-gendered, and in those circumstances I am appropriately chastened for failing to acknowledge that fact, for taking my gendering to be unmarked while someone else's is marked. That is, while it may often be just fine for me-as it ought to be just fine for a trans woman-to identify simply as a woman, it is not solely up to me to determine when and why it might not be just fine: judgments of importance or appropriateness are not solely mine to make.
The problem is not quite the same as that facing trans women and men, who are subject to the charge of being deceptive when they do not reveal their being trans under circumstances when others take themselves to have a right to that information; I am not imagining a situation in which a cis-gendered person is passing as trans. It is not, that is, a matter of knowledge-in the situations I have in mind everyone involved knows that I am cis-gendered-but of acknowledgement. And what needs acknowledging is not just the fact of my conforming to heteronormative gendering, but, more crucially, my-ourroles in shaping the meaning of gender, in setting the terms of intelligibility.
Those who are policing the borders of gender and Jewishness are policing me in, and my ethical responsibility begins with acknowledging that interpellation, acknowledging that: yes, I am a woman; I am a Jew; and then committing myself to challenging the terms of that policing, as well as to calling out those who invoke my name to justify the subordination, marginalization, or oppression of others. 
